Abstract-We investigate how delayed communication affects the dynamic formation of groups in distributed systems, where all decision-making agents join the same group because each expects to improve its own performance. For example, distributed job schedulers may form a group to utilize the idle resources of other members within the group. Forming a group is a search problem and we examine agents that use the feedback mechanism of stochastic learning automata to carry out this search. Although a group formation may have the potential for synergy, the agents must successfully coordinate their actions within the group relevant to the application. For example, job schedulers who form a group must still balance the load among the shared resources; that is, the collective actions of the schedulers need to be coordinated and greedy schedulers who all pick the same processor may not be successful. Agents may find that working alone is more desirable since their actions need not be coordinated and the results of their own actions are more predictable. An additional challenge to the search problem is to cope with the delay in communication between the agents. The purpose of this study is to model systems where agents adaptively search for compatible co-workers, under the constraint of delayed communication. With insufficient communication, the agents decide to work alone (and receive a modest benefit) but, with sufficient communication, the agents make the more advantageous decision to work together.
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I. INTRODUCTION E ARE interested in decision-making agents that
W have access to resources in a distributed system and whose goal is to improve performance in some application domain. As an example, job schedulers can improve performance by sharing a set of processors as some of the processors may be lightly loaded when some of the job schedulers are faced with a heavy load [ 11, [2] . Typically, it is assumed that all of the processors are under the control of all of the job schedulers. By default, it is assumed that the best interacting set of schedulers and processors is the system as a whole. Our long-term research plan is to investigate whether this is true, or whether smaller groups of schedulers and processors can be expected to perform better. In particular, we are interested in systems where some group formations are more advantageous than others, where agents must search for the optimal group formation, and where communication delays can affect the results of the search.
First, let us consider why some group formations may be more advantageous than others. We expect that smaller groups, or at least some division by groups, may generate better performance for several reasons. The complexity of the interaction is reduced with fewer decision makers in a group. Certainly, if all agents in a cooperating group must communicate with each other, then it is better to have smaller groups. A smaller group may be more compatible in terms of resources, constraints, job streams, and strategies. This compatibility should translate into better coordination, which is informally defined as "the activity of independent agents making harmonious, nonconflicting decisions," which is similar in spirit to [3] . And finally, we expect the improved coordination, or "harmony," to translate into improved performance. However, a small group does not have the same advantage as a large group in terms of utilizing shared resources. The system as a whole has the greatest potential for utilizing shared resources but also has the greatest decision-making complexity and the greatest potential for incompatibility.
This suggests that an optimal group formation may be of a particular size and agent composition, depending upon the application. However, the optimal group formation is not a static property (due to changing environmental conditions) and is not under the control of a central decision maker. This argues for autonomous agents that continually apply a search mechanism to find the optimal group formation.
Our choice of a probabilistic search strategy for group formation has been influenced by the randomness of bio- Randomized decisions are useful for three reasons: to break symmetry in distributed systems, to reduce the need for complex interactions among the agents, and to easily incorporate adaptive feedback mechanisms. We have chosen the adaptive strategies of stochastic learning automata
[6], [7] as a simple, well-studied feedback mechanism. If an agent selects a particular group and derives a reasonable benefit, then the probability of selecting the group in the future should be increased. Obviously, if the resultant benefit is low, then the probability should be decreased.
The decision concerning with whom to coordinate is 0018-9472/93$03.00 0 1993 IEEE called the SPACE decision. In addition to selecting a group to work in, the agents must successfully coordinate their actions within the group relevant to the application; we call this the ACTION decision. For example, job schedulers who form a group must still balance the load among the shared resources, and greedy schedulers who all pick the same processor may not be successful. The collective actions of greedy schedulers are an example of mutually conflicting decisions, and illustrate a breakdown in coordination. The incompatibility of the schedulers' strategies suggests that the synergy of the group is not realizable and that the group is not a good candidate for future interactions. Agents may find that working alone is more desirable since the results of their own actions are more predictable and the decisions are not subject to coordination failure. As a first contribution, we concentrate on the agents' choice of working alone or working together in pairs, illustrating the first question agents must face in a large system. And last, we investigate the effects of delayed communication on the search for optimal group formation. A challenge of distributed decision making is to cope with the ever-present delay in communication between the agents. The delay is caused by two characteristics: the finite transmission delay along a channel and by the intermittent pattern of agents sending messages concerning the global state. The delay causes each agent to have an aged view of the actual global state. Because of the emphasis on communication, we call this decision making under delayed communication.
The decision makers must make good, though not necessarily optimal, decisions, in an environment that does not permit frequent communication. Decisions must be made quickly, without the overhead of transmitting, receiving, and interpreting messages, which detract from the actual work performed. However, it is important for agents to communicate to have a reasonable view of the global state and in particular, the intentions of other agents. Frequent communication decreases the uncertainty in global state but has a cost that can adversely affect the performance. The problem is to make good decisions with limited communication of state information to reduce overhead.
We focus on the effects of delayed communication when agents communicate their randomized strategies conceming group formation. Each agent maintains an aged view of the other agents' likelihood of joining a group. However, assuming only periodic message transmission, an agent may not have an accurate perception of the other agents' strategies and may make poor decisions. The period of communication is the independent variable in our job scheduling experiment in Section V and the results show that, with insufficient communication, the agents decide to work alone (a local optimum) but, with sufficient communication, the agents make the more advantageous decision to work together (a global optimum).
In summary, the purpose of this paper is to model systems where agents adaptively search for optimal group formation, under the constraint of delayed communication.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I1 presents related work and our contribution; Section I11 formalizes the model; Section IV describes job scheduling of producer-consumer pairs; Section V presents results of simulation, with analysis in Section VI. Our conclusions are presented in Section VII.
RELATED WORK
Decentralized control is distributed decision making concerning resource management and ''the most decentralized case is where every management decision for every resource is made cooperatively by all managers" [8] . Distributed decision makers may not have a complete model of the system; instead, the control activities may be partitioned to experts [9] or the decision makers may have access to different information concerning underlying uncertainties [lo] . We are interested in systems where controllers dynamically form groups and manage the shared resources of the members of the group; we call this dynamic scope of control. We do not assume a priori that the system as a whole is the best interacting set of controllers and resources.
The application area is load balancing where job schedulers attempt to improve performance by sharing a set of processors and balancing the length of the job queues. The research has evolved from static to dynamic load balancing (see below) and our contribution is to extend the research in a new dimension from static group formation to dynamic group formation.
We summarize some of the representative research, and this current study, in Fig. 1 
application with dynamic characteristics (e. g., Poisson arrival rates and exponentially distributed service times). Another distributed scheduler is market-based [2 13 where managers participate in the bidding for processing power; their cash flow indicates their role in the distributed system. Managers with currency surpluses are accepting many jobs or offloading very few and managers with currency shortages are either generating too many jobs or accepting too few.
The previous research is by definition static in the group formation dimension since the entire system corresponds to the group (with the exception of [22] where optimal static partitions are examined analytically). We propose to extend the group formation dimension by considering dynamic characteristics. We do this because it is unreasonable to assume, a priori, that all of the agents in a large network form the most compatible group to work together. Also, an optimal group formation at one particular time may not be the optimal group formation at some later time. We have chosen to use the same adaptive strategies of stochastic learning automata [ 6 ] , [7] that have been successful in the lower-left quadrant of dynamic load balancing.
However, as a first contribution to group formation research, we have chosen to go back to static load balancing where, by definition, an assumption is made concerning average performance based upon the decisions and the static payoffs, described in Section 111, represent this average performance. Using queueing theory, this means that we assume deterministic interarrival times (e.g., a job arrives at a scheduler every time unit) and deterministic service times (e.g., a job receives one time unit of service). Our results show that, with sufficient communication, the adaptive strategy in the dynamic formation of groups is locally optimal for a static load balancing application.
The evolution of research should lead to the remaining quadrant of dynamic system state and dynamic group formation. We expect that adaptive strategies will prevail in this quadrant as suggested by the success of stochastic learning automata in the static system state and dynamic group formation quadrant (this study and that job schedulers that implicitly form groups based upon the processors they control can, in fact, improve performance over one large static group. The system is modeled with a dynamic system state due to exponentially distributed interarrival and service times.
THE MODEL
We describe the model according to the motivation in the introduction, that is, group formation, the search for optimal group formation, and delayed communication.
Finally, we present the combined model for simulation. We call this a distributed game automaton (DGA), which represents an agent searching for optimal group formation, under the constraint of delayed communication.
A . The Group Model
We model two types of decisions that an agent must make as a member of a distributed system. First, in the ACTION dimension, an agent must make a decision that is relevant to the application at hand. The dimension may consist of a large set of alternatives and allows the model to be generic and capture a variety of applications. Second, in the SPACE dimension, an agent must decide with whom to coordinate or what group formation is preferred. In particular, we examine agents that have a choice of working alone or working in pairs. This aspect of the model is application independent except for the number of agents in the system and is the salient feature of the model. Of course, since both decisions affect performance, a decision in one dimension may affect decision making in the other dimension. The goal is to make the best combined set of decisions to maximize the performance.
We define a coalition as a group whose members have agreed to work together and who expect a payoff, or resultant performance, based upon their collective decisions. Otherwise, a decision maker may decide to act alone as a singleton and receive payoffs based only on its own decisions. For a 2-agent system, these payoffs are modeled as a game with a set of matrices containing the payoffs associated with each combination of ACTION decisions: The matrices DI2 and 02' represent the payoffs to player 1 and player 2, respectively, when members of the coalition. When acting as singletons, D1 and D2 represent the payoffs to players 1 and 2, respectively. For example, DA:a2 is the payoff to player 1 when choosing action a1 while player 2 chooses action a2, where ai E (0, l } . As singletons, Dt2 is the payoff to player 2 when choosing action a2. The structure of a game refers to the size, or dimension, of the game matrix; in a 2-agent system, the structure may either be a 2-player matrix or a 1-player matrix, hence a vector. The matrix signifies that a group has action dependency and the vector signifies that agents working alone have action independency. An example of these game matrices is presented in Fig.  2 with the pure equilibria in boldface; that is, an action pair ( a l , a2) provides no motivation, in terms of payoff, for a player to alter its action assuming that the other player does not do so. For example, action pair (0, 0) in a coalition returns a payoff of one to both players and neither can do better by changing its action. It is easy to find equilibrium in the singleton vectors: in both cases, the players should select action 1 to get the best payoff.
We now consider the decisions that determine whether the agents work together or work alone. Each agent i makes a SPACE decision concerning every other agent j in the system. If pi, = 1, then agent i is willing to form a group with agent j ; otherwise, if Pij = 0, then i is not willing to work with j . For a 2-agent system, a coalition is formed if, and only if, both agents agree (Le., P = pI2 = 1). Otherwise, both agents act as singletons. The two dimensions of ACTION and SPACE are presented in Fig. 3 along with an example vector and matrix. In the SPACE dimension, determines whether the agents work alone (the performance is quantified by a vector D', one for each agent) or whether two agents work together in a group (the performance is quantified by two matrices, D" and D j i , which are combined into a bimatrix or game representation). An agent also makes an ACTION decision (labeled ai) that indexes into either the vector or the matrix. In the case of the two-dimensional matrix, one decision ai indexes one dimension and the other decision a, ( by 1 three-dimensional matrix for the entire system working as a group along with 3 two-dimensional matrices for agents working in pairs and three vectors for agents working alone. We have considered such systems [23] but report only on the 2-agent system in this paper, as this is sufficient to illustrate the effects of delayed communication on group formation and is simple to understand.
B. The Search Model
We now consider the agents' decision making in the ACTION-SPACE dimensions over time and their search for optimal group formation. We examine a load balancing application with two job schedulers and two processors. A job amves at each of the schedulers at every time step t E [0, n -11 and both schedulers must make an ACTION and SPACE decision. Let job scheduler i make the ACTION decision CY, concerning which processor ID should be selected for the job. A job receives one time unit of work and then vanishes, or returns for more service. If two agents have decided (in the SPACE dimension) to form a group, then the collective actions, ( a l , a2), determine the amount of work that can be performed on the two jobs; hopefully, the agents select different processors so that more work can be done. The objective is to maximize the payoffs in the game D over all agents' ACTION-SPACE decisions over all time. In Section IV, we expand on the job scheduling problem to show a situation where either action dependency or independency arises based upon the agents' decision to work together or alone, respectively.
The decision making in the ACTION and SPACE dimensions is restricted since there is insufficient time to determine the coalition of the moment (i.e., the results of all agents' SPACE decisions) and to implement a unique strategy for the action. An action decision must be made in the face of uncertainty concerning the coalition formation. This leads to a restricted subset of general N-player games since the strategies available to each player are restricted. For instance, [26] describes correlated mixed strategies, originally presented in [27] and suggests a correlated mixed extension where a strategy of player i consists of a 3-tuple ( C , D~, 0 , ) in which C is his choice of a coalition, u, his choice of a correlated mixed strategy, and u, his choice of an individual mixed strategy. The choice of u, is carried out if and only if each player in C chooses C and also a,; otherwise, the choice u, is carried out [26] .
In our ACTION-SPACE model, the same action decision a, applies regardless of the coalition formation determined by 0,; this corresponds to the 3- tuple (p,,, a,, 
a,).
At the current time step, agent i makes a randomized decision concerning group formation with agent j ; let the clustering probability c,, = Pr[ P,, = 11. Each agent's c,, are modified over time according to the Reward-Penalty scheme of stochastic learning automata [6] , [7] . This allows an agent to search for better performance in terms of group affiliation.
In a 2-agent system, the clustering parameter c = c ,~ * c21 determines the overall likelihood of group formation and represents the fundamental uncertainty in the SPACE dimension. That is, with probability c , the agents work together and, with probability 1 -c, the agents work alone. As agents modify their own cy over time, they effectively search out the domain of the clustering parameter. We shall now consider the landscape that adaptive agents face in terms of the clustering parameter.
A probabilistic coalition is a coalition in which the formation decision is based upon the result of a random device that accepts as input the clustering parameter c E [0,
11. An average 2-player game, D = { D12, d' }, is induced by the clustering parameter where
An example of an average game induced by a clustering parameter ( c = 0.75) is shown in Fig. 4 . Obviously, if c = 1 then the average game is just the original 2-player game and the combined payoff, or system gain, at equilibrium is 5 + 5 = 10. If c = 0 then the average game is just the replication of the two vectors (because of action independency) and the combined payoff at equilibrium is 3 + 3 = 6 . Note that at c = 0.75, we expect the combined payoff at equilibrium to be 4.5 + 4.0 = 8.5.
Although the SPACE decision pii is made probabilistically, the ACTION decision ai is made rationally; that is, the players determine the best actions, subject to equilibrium in a game. We have chosen rational players to eliminate coordination problems of actions within a group so as to concentrate on the effects of delayed communication upon the group formation decisions. The agents make the best decision possible under the circumstances of their environment, or equivalently, we are presenting the bestcase scenario for adaptive behavior in the ACTION dimension. We call this decision-making mechanism AC-TION Rationalization-SPACE Randomization (ARSR).
The value of the clustering parameter c (i.e., the fundamental uncertainty in the SPACE dimension) affects the game that rational agents expect to play. Fig. 5 is an analytic prediction 'of the gain for the game in Fig. 4 , as a function of the clustering parameter c; we assume the gain is determined by the combined payoff at equilibrium in the average game induced by c. This analytic treatment includes the c = 0, 0.75, and 1 cases discussed above. Note that maxima occur at the boundaries (c = 0 and 1) and that the equilibrium representing coalition formation (c = 1) is the best. We will show that the period of communication can affect which maxima is reached by adaptive agents that adjust their own cU (and hence, sample various clustering parameters c ) .
C. The Communication Model
The decision making in the ACTION-SPACE dimensions is under the constraint of delayed communication. The strategy cij is communicated every P time units, with a delay of T time units and at a cost of C in payoff or gain units. The communication of this probabilistic strategy allows each agent to maintain a view of the other agents' willingness to form a group; for example, cji is i's view o f j ' s willingness to form a group with i. Since the strategy is modified over time, each agent has an aged view of the other agents' strategies (the maximum age is P + T and the minimum age is T ) . The accuracy of this view can affect an agent's decision making. Note that the agents cannot afford to communicate the actual decision pii or probabilistic strategy cij every time unit because of the overhead cost C.
D. The Combined Simulation Model (DGA)
We combine the three models of group formation, the search for optimal group formation, and delayed communication into one simulation model. A decision-making agent, or distributed game automaton (DGA), employs ACTION Rationalization-SPACE Randomization, as shown in Fig. 6 . Each agent, or player, in a distributed system is modeled as an automaton with three main features. First, each agent i has a local variable, the clustering probability til, which describes the likelihood that agent i will agree to join a group with agent j . This represents the strategy in the SPACE dimension and is communicated periodically to the other agents. Second, each agent i maintains a view of the other agents' local variables cj, that it receives via communication. Third, an algorithm uses the local variable and the view of other agents' local variables to make decisions.
In particular, the algorithm has a reactive component and a rational component to make decisions in the SPACE and ACTION dimensions, respectively. These decisions are input to a directional heuristic that provides feedback to the clustering probability to increase the likelihood of good decisions in the future. We are interested in how the agents adaptively modify the clustering probability (i.e., search for optimal group formation) with respect to the amount of communication between the agents.
To explain the model further, we will examine one decision-making event as triggered by a clock pulse at time t , signaling a new stage of the game (e.g., the arrival of a job). For simplicity, it is assumed that both players share a global clock such that the clock pulses are synchronized (representing a deterministic interarrival time for jobs).
The reactive component flips a coin whose weight is cQ and the resultant decision (in the SPACE dimension) is pii E (0, l}. That is, if pii = 1, agent i agrees to join a group with agent j . An agent that agrees to form a group with another agent still has uncertainty concerning the decision of the other agent.
The rational component determines a decision in the ACTION dimension relevant to the application, say a, E {0, l } although other applications may require a larger set of alternative actions. The rational component makes the best decision possible given three types of information. First, the rational component knows whether the agent has agreed to join a group with another agent, and second, has some knowledge of the likelihood of the other agent agreeing to the group formation. However, the view of the other agent's probability is aged information; that is, the view is the value at some earlier time as determined by the most recent message received by the agent. This is The probability of coalition formation determines the induced, or average, game and the rational component determines the action that yields the highest combined payoff that is in equilibrium with the other players' rational choices. (For applications with a set of n actions, an average game can still be computed from the vectors and matrices; the end result is an n X n matrix for each player.) We assume the games present no difficulties in achieving equilibrium due to competitiveness; that is, the Pareto-efficient action combination is a Nash equilibrium as in coordination games [28]. For applications where the induced game may not have a pure strategy equilibrium, the players select the action pair that yields the highest combined payoff. In addition, we assume a tie-breaking rule is available for multiple Pareto-optima. These assumptions reflect our interest in the effects of communication on the ability to reach the best equilibrium in the 2-player versus 1-player games. We are not concerned with the difficulties of rational agents reaching equilib-rium in 2-player games; this interesting game-theoretic issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
Both the ACTION (a,) and SPACE (P,,) decisions are input to the directional heuristic, which returns feedback r,, E [ -1, + 11 affecting the clustering probability c, , based upon the "goodness" of the SPACE decision. In our experiments, this heuristic is the Reward-Penalty scheme of stochastic learning automata [ 6 ] . The feedback is based on the expected payoff using the view of other agent's willingness to form a coalition. The better the view, as determined by the most recent message concerning the clustering probability c;,, the more accurate the feedback. Note that the feedback is internal to the automaton and does not come from the environment. We are interested in static load balancing where average performance values in the application tables (i.e., the game) can be downloaded into the decision maker in advance.
The best reward ( + 1 ) occurs when the P,, decision is expected to achieve the maximum possible payoff (in the application tables) and the worst penalty ( -1) occurs for the minimum possible payoff; feedback can range between these values with zero being the midpoint between the maximum and minimum payoff. If the decision is to work alone (0, = 0) and a reward results, then the probability of agreeing to group formation ( c , ) at the next clock pulse is decreased (proportional to the reward). If the decision is to work together (0, = 1) and a reward results, then the probability should be increased. (If a penalty occurs in either case, then the probability should be adjusted in the opposite manner.)
Whereas the reactive component makes current decisions, the directional heuristic affects fiture decisions. The agent implements both the ACTION and SPACE decisions in the environment and will make both decisions again at the next clock pulse. The parameters, update functions, and gain are detailed in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 . IV. AN APPLICATION: JOB SCHEDULING An important and illustrative application in distributed systems is job schedulers that access a set of shared processors. We consider two schedulers each with a job stream and two shared processors. The jobs at the head of the streams represent a producer and consumer pair, a common attribute in distributed systems.
Let us now consider a concrete example that generates the 2-player and 1-player game structures in Fig. 4 ; the SPACE decision determines which game will be played. By definition, the payoff to a player in a 2-player game is dependent upon the other player's ACTION decision, whereas the payoff in a one-player game is independent of the other player's decision. Since the action decision is over the set of processor IDS, applications that have both "processor-bound'' and "I/O-bound" environments will exhibit this behavior. As an example, the producer-consumer pair in Fig. 9 has a coordination mode and noncoordination mode. In the coordination mode, the producer and consumer processes run in parallel with the output of the producer going to the consumer in fine grain communication along a data channel; the processor power constrains the performance of the pair. In the noncoordination mode, the producer and consumer processes run sequentially with the output of the producer going to an intermediate file on disk; the disk access now constrains the performance. The processor characteristics in Table I lead to the game payoffs in Fig. 4 and, in particular, show that both players selecting action 1 has the worst outcome in the 2-player game but the best outcome in the 1-player games. Note that processor 1 has faster access to disk due to channel connections with the file manager or the disk being local to processor 1.
In the coordination mode, if the producer and consumer processes are placed on distinct, but equally fast processors, then the parallelism is optimized and five units of work are performed by each processor. However, if both are placed on the same processor, then only its power is available with some loss due to the overhead of managing two jobs. If processor 0 is selected, there is sufficient memory to store both the producer and consumer processes and each process receives two units of work (which is designed to run the consumer after the producer has created the intermediate file. In this mode, the sequential nature makes processor 1's small memory irrelevant but fast access to disk makes processor 1 the better choice. Also, if the same processor is selected, the 1/0 time does not expand since there is no interference between the reading and writing operations. In this I/O-bound environment, the payoff to a player is independent of the other player's decision, but the faster disk access by processor 1 makes this the optimal choice for both players; the payoff is 3 for selecting processor 1 versus the payoff of 1 for selecting processor 0. Each player determines that pro- large small models overhead due to time-sharing). But if processor 1 is selected, there is only sufficient memory for one of the processes and thrashing arises as both processes are repeatedly read from disk; the payoff is zero units of work. In all cases, the payoff to a player, or scheduler, is dependent upon the other player's decision. In the noncoordination mode, both processes can run on the same processor, without loss, since the operation of the other player.
V. EXPERIMENT
We present simulation results, in Fig. 10 , of an experiment using the design in Table I1 that includes the game description for the load balancing application; note that the period of communication is the independent variable. The landscape that adaptive agents face for this game (as a function of c) has already been presented in Fig. 5 . The results, in Fig. 10 , show the trade-off in communication: frequent communication leads to good decisions (and overhead) while infrequent communication leads to poor decisions. In this case, a good decision is to coordinate and form a coalition; the maximum payoff is 5, which is greater than the maximum payoff of 3 when working alone in a noncoordination mode. Both the payoffs represent an equilibrium but the players adaptively seek a different equilibrium based upon the period of communication.
With sufficient communication, the players agree to coordinate and achieve the best-case result of a coalition. However, when the period of communication exceeds 90 time units, each player has an aged view of the other player's willingness to form a coalition; this leads to a breakdown in coordination. Note that, as the period of communication approaches 1, the average overhead ( C / P ) approaches 5 , eliminating the gain of the coordination mode.
The results in Fig. 10 depend on the initialization of the clustering values cij. Fig. 11 shows the tendency of players to coordinate based upon cluster initialization; the results include the (0.75, 0.33) initialization used in the experiment design, Table 11 . The simulations are run with a period P = 150 (which resulted in suboptimal performance shown in Fig. 10 ). Each initialization pair (in the interior of the plot) represents a probability, or willingness, to coordinate. The results show the adaptation, or tracks, until the search leads to a steady state in one of the upper comers of the plot, that is, a coordination equilibrium (both are willing to form a coalition) or a noncoordination equilibrium (at least one player is not willing to form a coalition). The cases where player 1 is initially willing to coordinate (high c ,~) but player 2 is not willing to coordinate (low cZ1) lead to the noncoordination mode.
However, with sufficient communication ( P < 90 in Fig. lo), even these cases achieve the coordination mode. the experiment in Fig. 10 ; note that the system enters a noncoordination mode when the period is 91 time units. Theorem 1 (Adaptive Coalitions): Let fabsorb(6) be the time required, without communication, to reach a singleton equilibrium with some small probability 6 that the coalition equilibrium will be attempted. Let r, be the reward for making coalition decision Pij = x . Given player i using a Reward-Penalty scheme (with small learning constant a and no variance in A c ) , initial clustering cii(0), initial view of playerj's clustering cji, and game matrices such that there is an expected decrease in clJ(r) due to the singleton equilibrium (i.e., ro > r l ) , then for the special case where the expected decrease is caused by rl = -ro Note that the special case rl = -rO is only used to pro- where a, is the singleton equilibrium choice (this is the stronger equilibrium since the clustering value is expected to decrease) and aj is the expected choice of a rational player in the 2-player game. In general, the reward is the normalized feedback:
BILLARD AND PASQUALE: EFFECTS OF DELAY ED COMMUNICATION
where m = max Dz,,,.
The Reward-Penalty scheme for updating c is
VI. ANALYSIS Theorem 1 predicts the time required, assuming no communication, for a player to reach a small probability of defecting from a singleton equilibrium. This time analysis gives an indication of the required level of communication needed to achieve coordination; that is, how long before players become locked into working alone rather than as a coalition? In particular. it predicts the small probability of coalition formation after 91 time units for
\-arO(l -c)
i f p , = 0, ro < o With probability 1 -c, we expect to update c with clause 2 of (3) and, with probability c , we expect to update c with clause 1 if rl I 0 or with clause 3, otherwise. Therefore, every time unit, load balancing research into a new quadrant of dynamic group formation and static system state. This paper has shown that the adaptive strategy of stochastic learning automata is successful for dynamic group formation in a static load balancing problem. The decision makers, employing ACTION Rationalization-SPACE Randomizaand, for the special case rl = -ro,
E [ A c ] = --roc.
Given that there is no variance in the random variable A c, that is, Ac = E [ A c ] (we shall see that the resultant formula is still a good predictor) and scaling to some small time interval Ar:
A c = -urocAr.
We know that A c approaches zero given the small leaming constant a . Integrating both sides, the time required for c to change from cu(0) to 6 is mension. Second, in the SPACE dimension, the adaptive strategy allows the agents to learn, over time, that higher payoffs are possible for working together. Although rationalization may lead to the same conclusion in this dimension, we are interested in future research in the remaining quadrant of dynamic group formation and dynamic system state. We expect that adaptive strategies, in both dimensions, will yield good performance in a distributed system where the feedback comes from a dynamic environment rather than a static description of the game payoffs. 
0
Note that other values of r , cause an expected decrease in c and the general case, using (4), leads to two complex integrals (based on rl 1 0 or r , < 0), which are solvable analytically. Fig. 10 shows that, with period P = 91, the players reach an equilibrium in the singleton games and a trace of the data shows that c21 ( t = 91) = 0.0187, The experiment design agrees with the special case rl = -ro and Theorem 1 predicts that tabsorb(0.0187) = 92.3, which is in close agreement.
We take this one step further by solving ( 5 ) for c , ( t ) :
This equation is plotted in Fig. 12 along with the observed N~~~ that the predicted and observed values completely coincide.
VII. CONCLUSION We have investigated how communication affects the dynamic formation of groups in a distributed load balancing application. The main task facing the job schedulers is to determine whether it is better to work together or to work alone. We have shown that, with sufficient communication, agents are able to reach a global optimum rather than a local optimum. That is, the agents make the advantageous decision to work together in a group when the period of communication is reasonably low. 
